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Comment and Discussion from the SAC
The “Comments” section of the SAC website is intended for short statements or the text of talks, in contrast to the longer Occasional Papers. All the comments represent the personal opinions of the authors and are provided as a contribution to debate. Publication does not imply they are endorsed by the SAC membership collectively or individually.
The Question of the Malvinas or the Falkland Islands
A British PerspectiveBy Dr Dudley Ankerson, CMG
Extracts from an interview, by Clara Riveros, a Colombian journalist, in Spanish under the title “De los Territorios No Autónomos: Aproximaciones, Miradas y Perspectivas” (On the Non-Self-Governing Territories: Approaches, Views and Perspectives), published on the Fundamedios You Tube TV channel, 14 October 2020.
Introduction by the Presenter, Clara Riveros
A few months ago, the American magazine The New Yorker published an extensive article – “How Prosperity Transformed the Falklands” – that recounts the history and sociology of the Malvinas or Falkland Islands from the 17th to the 21st century. It can be said that the article clearly presents the perceptions and positions of the Islanders. The absence of a common past or history, as well as elements or perspectives for a common future shared between the Islanders and Argentina, is striking. Some inferences can be made from the article about different events that make up the mistakes and wrongs of both the United Kingdom and Argentina when it comes to consolidating their claims and the future of the territory whose sovereignty the two States dispute.
For example, in 1981, the United Kingdom proposed the handover of the territory to Argentina in a long-term “lease” agreement similar to that of Hong Kong. Another issue had to do with the fact that the House of Lords denied British citizenship to the Islanders around the same time. These actions made the Islanders feel that they were seen as a problem. In addition, it is noteworthy that the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office routed goods and services to the islands via Argentina and not directly from Great Britain. This could have fuelled the Argentine claim to the territory.
On the other hand, Argentina did not prioritise either rational argument or a peaceful approach to reaching a settlement. In the political context of the country – an unpopular military dictatorship desperately seeking national cohesion – stirring up the issue of sovereignty could yield some benefits and gains in the short term. The military government opted for this route – it instrumentalised the Malvinas question – and led the country to a war that should never have happened. The Argentine military invasion was a great mistake. The article argues that the Argentine military came to “liberate” those who did not ask to be liberated and, on the contrary, the Islanders demonstrated that they felt very British. The reality: the Islanders were with the United Kingdom and supported the British military, not the Argentines.
The post-war period changed the nature of the dispute and the territory. Note that after the war the United Kingdom promoted the modernisation and prosperity of the territory, as well as the rights of the Islanders as British citizens. It is striking, sociologically-speaking, that there are Islanders who long for the past and somewhat resent the cosmopolitanism and current prosperity of the territory. Why is this so? Because of the disruptive effect of modernity. The bonds of solidarity that they had as a community in the past originated from the poverty, hardships and needs they had then as a community. Now there is prosperity, development, tourism, modernisation and foreigners. The 2016 census shows only 43% of the population living in the Falklands was born in the Islands. Of the rest, approximately half, are British and half are citizens of 58 other countries (which may be just two people from each country considering that very few people live on these islands). The article states that all the Islanders – except three – want to maintain the status of British Overseas Territory. [01] Remember that this territory is one of the 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories covered by the United Nations 'Special Committee for Decolonization' or 'C-24' and has the United Kingdom as its administering power.
The economic aspect in the disputed islands or territory is also not a minor element – for example, the per capita income of the Islanders has become comparable to that of Norway and Qatar. This suggests a forceful fact that works against the aspirations of Argentina. Seeing the chaotic political and economic reality of a populist Argentina that has been mired in different crises for decades, some concerns arise: what makes Buenos Aires think that the Islanders today would like to be part of Argentina? Would the Islanders want to go from being prosperous to citizens of a bankrupt country, with a ruined economy and unflattering statistics? (Let us not delve, for the time-being, into political and institutional questions that compromise the democratic quality of the Argentine system.) That does not seem close to reality. Argentina maintains a poverty and inflation rate of around 50%. The per capita income in Argentina (some 20,570 USD) is comparable to that of Bulgaria, Libya, Iran, Belarus or Mexico and is below the level of Chile and Uruguay.
In Argentina, it is true, the Malvinas question is active. In January, the new President, Alberto Fernández, said, referring to the disputed territory: “We are never going to give up”. In March, he stated that Argentina has a bleeding wound: “The usurpation of the Malvinas”. In September, in his first speech as President at the United Nations, he condemned what, according to him, is a threatening strategy of the United Kingdom in the Malvinas Islands. Alberto Fernández adopted “the Malvinas cause”, emulating the position held by the previous president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. As the Argentine media has said, it was during the Kirchner administration that the moments of “greatest tension between the Islanders and Argentina” were experienced. It is evident that this issue has not been abandoned by the Argentines and that the government arouses nationalism through a populist discourse. In Buenos Aires they persist in what must be a deliberate omission by not sufficiently considering the wishes and aspirations of the Islanders: that is the will of the indigenous population of the disputed territory.
There are some Argentine intellectuals who argue that the Malvinas case should be taken to The Hague: Is that a good idea? Different cases illustrate the risks of going to The Hague. Bilateral negotiations taking into account the opinion of the Islanders seems to be the most reasonable way to resolve the territorial dispute. Vicente Palermo, an intellectual from Buenos Aires, proposes to change the approach and the language – when talking about the Malvinas/Falklands dispute – he suggests starting to talk about the “Malvinas question” and no longer about the “Malvinas cause”. The change in language and the evolution of the debate – of course, starting with the Argentine government – would be an achievement. This would allow for a more technical, less action-oriented, less passionate, more reasonable and professional diplomatic approach.
I spoke to the former British diplomat, Dudley Ankerson, on all these issues. Ankerson was a member of the United Kingdom Diplomatic Service from 1976 to 2006, he is an expert on Latin America and, currently, he acts as consultant on the assessment of political risk, for British companies. He has been an advisor to Latin American governments on security and peace issues. He was decorated in Colombia (which granted him Colombian citizenship) and, also, in Mexico, where he received the Mexican Order of the Aztec Eagle for his contribution to Anglo-Mexican relations.
The Interview
Clara Riveros – What are the legal arguments and historical elements that are the basis on which the United Kingdom administers and claims the territory of Malvinas / Falklands, one of the 17 territories registered as non-self-governing in the United Nations?
Dudley Ankerson – First of all, I want to thank you for your kind invitation to participate in this conversation on such an important topic. Second, before addressing the questions you have put on the table, I want to emphasise that everything I say is entirely a personal opinion. It is purely my own point of view.
With regard to the first question the historical and judicial arguments concerning the Falklands Islands are unclear and in dispute. Historically the issue goes back to the sixteen century, possibly back to the Treaty of Tordesillas and involves the Spanish, the French, the Dutch and the British and, after their independence from Spain, the Argentines. It even involves the United States as well, in view of the activities of the American frigate USS Lexington in December 1831.
There are differences in interpretation over the legal significance of the actions of the various actors throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Between 1763 and 1833 there was what experts in international law call “competing state activity” which is open to differing interpretations and which the two sides to the dispute duly interpret differently. The situation under international law is similarly in dispute between the two sides, although in my personal view the Argentine legal case seems stronger but not conclusive. The most comprehensive academic study from a legal perspective is by Harvard Professor Julius Goebel in 1927, but this work does not represent the last word among specialists in the field.
I am referring here to the Falkland Islands. The situation regarding the dependencies - South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands - is different, both historically and legally.
With regard to the British side of the dispute the official position as outlined by the Foreign Secretary in 1982, is based on “the facts, upon prescription and upon the principle of self-determination”. As I have said, the facts are open to different interpretation and many academic experts in international law question whether prescription, i.e. continuous peaceful occupation, is an accepted doctrine in international law. However, the heart of the British case is the concept of self-determination, that is the fact that the Islanders have no wish for the sovereignty over the islands that they inhabit to be transferred to Argentina. There is no disputing this sentiment. In a referendum held in 2013, 99.8% percent of them voted to reject any change in their status. [02] Negotiations between the two countries, before the Argentine invasion in 1982, unsuccessfully sought a compromise acceptable to both parties.
Clara Riveros – It is understood that the solution for the different territorial disputes today must include the wishes of the populations that inhabit the territories. What is the British position on the matter and what is the current situation and the political, economic and social reality of the disputed territory and its population?
Dudley Ankerson – When formulating policy towards the Falklands Islands prior to the Argentine invasion of 1982, the British government took three factors into account, above all: the interests of the Islanders; the strategic interests of the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic; and the Anglo-Argentine relationship. The British government of the day regarded “lease-back” as an acceptable means of meeting these requirements. Under this arrangement sovereignty over the islands would have been transferred to Argentina but the British government would have leased them back for a period of 50 to 100 years and administered the islands as before. The British government discussed this idea with the Argentine negotiators in 1980-81 and then put it to parliament. While the interests of the Islanders were considered paramount prior to 1982, their wishes were not, although they were taken into consideration.
The idea of lease-back idea was not well received in the British parliament, partly because of distrust of political instability in Argentina between 1945 and 1980 and partly because the government in Argentina was a military junta with a terrible human rights record. Nevertheless, the government would probably have persisted with the idea, in the hope of persuading political and public opinion and especially opinion in the islands that it was the best course. The Argentine invasion in 1982 put an end to this possibility.
In fact, the Argentine invasion and occupation of the islands by force changed everything. Such a resort to force to resolve a diplomatic dispute represented a dangerous principle, not only with regard to this dispute, but in other regional and global contexts. The government of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had no choice but to respond militarily. Nevertheless, in the intense diplomacy prior to the arrival of the British Task Force, she offered the Argentine junta discussions which would almost inevitably have led to an eventual transfer of sovereignty, but the junta rejected them.
The Argentine invasion left the Islanders deeply scarred and confirmed them in their wish to remain firmly independent of Argentina. It also changed the politics of the dispute. After 1982 no British government could be seen to contemplate a transfer of sovereignty in any form for the foreseeable future. And thereafter the wishes of the Islanders, as well as their interests, were considered paramount.
Following the Argentine invasion the emphasis of the British government switched to military deterrence: that is ensuring that Argentina would not be tempted to resort to a military solution to the problem again; and to strengthen the economy of the islands to increase their income and offer greater self-sufficiency. The key to this policy was the exploitation of maritime resources, especially fishing, and tourism. Fishing currently accounts for 50-60% of the islands' GDP with agriculture and tourism making up the balance. In fact, since 1982, the islands' economy and administration have been transformed from a pastoral economy and basic administration to a more advanced economy and administration. Between 1982 and 2020 the population has increased from 1,900 to 3,400 with migrant labour a small but significant element in the work force.
Exploration in the islands' maritime zone has confirmed the presence of oil, but so far the exploitation of these deposits has not been considered commercially viable.
In political terms the issue of the Falkland Islands has faded from memory in the UK. The war took place almost forty years ago. However, if the issue were to arise again, public opinion in the UK would support the Islanders, who remain totally opposed to any transfer of sovereignty.
Clara Riveros – Do you think that the Malvinas / Falklands issue should be resolved in The Hague? Or, what would be the British move to settle this dispute with Argentina?
Dudley Ankerson – Neither Argentina nor the UK has been prepared to take the dispute to the International Court in The Hague. To do so would imply that there is a case to answer, whereas each insists on the correctness of their respective position, be it under international law or following the principle of self-determination. But neither can they take the risk politically. Countries that turn to The Hague want and expect to win, but also believe that they can accept the political consequences if they lose. Neither Argentina nor the UK is prepared to take that risk. The UK was prepared to take the case of the dependencies – South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands – to The Hague prior to 1982, but not the Falklands. Argentina is not prepared to do so with either.
The dispute over the Falkland Islands does not lend itself to a satisfactory solution for either Argentina or the United Kingdom on the terms in which it has been considered so far, be it a claim under international law or an appeal for self-determination. It can only be managed with as little friction as possible, which depends on the willingness of all three parties, Argentina, the UK and the Islanders, to avoid provocation or incidents of conflict. However, there is a way forward, which has always existed, with the possibility of a change in attitude on the part of the Islanders.
Allow me to imagine that I am the Argentine Foreign Minister reflecting upon the problem, alone, at home.
The fundamental problem is that our narrative does not truly resonate with the international community because it is not based on a grave injustice: this is not Palestine, there are no displaced people crying out for restitution of their birthplace. We can use the history of the Malvinas in the nineteenth century, but everyone knows that our claim is about land, not people. We make the situation worse by not acknowledging the existence of the Islanders, let alone talking to them. For a 21st century international audience this attitude is disconcerting: we seem old-fashioned, high-handed and, yes, a little colonialist in our approach. The hallmark of a colonialist is someone who values territory over people. And in the modern world proximity is not in itself a justification for unification. If it were so, the maps of Latin America and Europe would be very different.
How can we improve our chance of achieving our objective? First, if we accept that this dispute is about people, not territory – which has been the key to all successful peace processes for the last fifty years. We have to accept that we cannot bully people to become part of our country, especially when they are increasingly self-sufficient. We can only persuade.
Persuasion will take time and effort, perhaps over several generations. In the 1970s the Islanders were becoming more and more linked with Argentina: they sent their children to study in schools in Buenos Aires; they came here for healthcare, shopping, cultural events and much more. Now these ties have been cut, not just by the conflict but because of our aggressive attitude. Our posture may make us feel good but it simply hardens attitudes in the islands. We need to accept that every time we try to force the issue the solution moves further away from us.
I believe the Malvinas can be part of Argentina once again, but only if the Islanders one day decide that they have more in common with us, that their future will be more prosperous and better protected with us, and that we will guarantee and respect their rights, and their particular and unique story.
That is why we need strategic patience. We need to start showing that we are interested in people and that we are behaving like a 21st century state, rather than fighting 19th Century battles. We must put aside the issue of sovereignty that has been so toxic – without abandoning it – and concentrate on rebuilding trust between peoples.
For my part and speaking personally, I think this is the best way forward.
References
- The reference to all, except three, of the Islanders wishing to maintain the status of the Falklands as a British Overseas Territory is to the result of the referendum held on 10-11 March 2013: see SAC Occasional Paper No. 12, by Peter Willetts A Report on the Referendum on the Political Status of the Falkland Islands, Table 9, June 2013. Return
- See Willetts, Table 9, cited above. Return
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