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Comment and Discussion from the SAC

The “Comments” section of the SAC website is intended for short statements or the text of talks, in contrast to the longer Occasional Papers. All the comments represent the personal opinions of the authors and are provided as a contribution to debate. Publication does not imply they are endorsed by the SAC membership collectively or individually.

 

Reflections on the South Atlantic and the South Atlantic Council:
Past, Present and Future.

Malcolm Deas, Emeritus Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 14 January 2020.

A talk given at an informal meeting of the South Atlantic Council, to pay tribute to and thank Lord O’Neill for his service as Chair of the SAC for 23 years.

Why have I agreed to give this talk? It is because I have a bad conscience. I have been rather a dormant member of the SAC, have in recent years attended few meetings and feel ashamed in the presence of more active colleagues. Why me? The war cost around nine hundred lives. My involvement was painless and peripheral. But at the time I did study the history of the dispute for some months, and wrote about it, and gave evidence about it to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Although my main field of study in South America is another country, Colombia, I made several visits to Argentina before the war and several after, have many friends there, some of whom have been in high places, and have followed the ups and downs of Anglo-Argentine relations, though again I am not a master of detail.

The history of the dispute is long and intricate, and a full rehearsal of it has to start at the end of the fifteenth century. It can enchant academics. To understand it requires not only a mastery of historical facts, many of them disputed, but also of the long evolution of public international law. I do not pretend to any profound expertise in either of these subjects, but I think I went far enough to reach some firm conclusions at the time, and have not seen reason to change them since.

First, the grounds of the two claims to sovereignty, the British and the Argentine, do not meet. [01]  The Argentine position is strong in classic international law terms – most authorities in that field do not admit prescription, the righting of wrongs by the passage of time – but, to cut long and intricate arguments brutally short, it lacks realism. The British argument, apart from prescription, is based on the self-determination of the inhabitants, which in this case few international lawyers would support. [02] 

Harry Ferns, in his book Argentina, published in 1969, made a prescient summary of the situation. “If the problem of the Falklands Malvinas Islands leads to tragedy, the disaster will be the prime instance of the effects of non-communication all round; of a national dilemma rendered lethal by separate and total ignorance from which the political neuroses of the parties prevent escape.” [03] 

Second, I think Mrs Thatcher was right to resist the Argentine attempt to resolve the dispute by force.

Third, the dispute is not solvable. Neither side has considered, nor will consider, taking it to any sort of arbitration, and neither side will abandon its claim.

Fourth, though it cannot be solved, it can be managed. Which brings me to the South Atlantic Council. What is the essential purpose of the South Atlantic Council? Let me suggest an imperfect analogy. On the return of civilian rule in Uruguay, President Sanguinetti was asked what was the role of the Uruguayan army. His unhesitating reply: "It is quite clear. It is to resist for a day. Then, if the Brazilians invade us, the Argentines will come to our help. If the Argentines invade, the Brazilians will come to our help." The role of the SAC is perhaps more modest, but I think it is none the less essential, not merely desirable. It is to ensure that no lobby has a monopoly of opinion, of public debate on the issues that may arise in the South Atlantic. To do so it must keep an eye on disputes that are at present relatively dormant, but which will not always necessarily remain so.

I make these points with no lack of respect for the opinions of the Islanders, though I cannot agree that their self-determination closes all argument. The SAC has always been respectful and I am sure all of us would be unhappy if that was not the case.

Many here present, all here present, will remember how in 1982 in Britain, and previously in the run-up to the war, ignorance about the history of the dispute, of the principles of international law involved, and of the dangers latent in its mismanagement was near universal. – I shared it. – To recall just a few particular instances: the Ridley affair; the admirable Lord Carrington’s admission that the Falklands question was number two hundred and something on his list of priorities, and his unawareness of where it was on the Argentine list, on the 150th anniversary of 1832; our Ambassador in Buenos Aires left only with "micawberism"; the Islands lobby’s uncontested influence where it mattered, in both political parties in Britain. And a more general unawareness: what had for long kept the question dormant was the importance of our trade with and investment in Argentina, progressively diminished since World War II.

So we went to war. I do not pretend in any way to be an expert on the war, about which a good deal has been written – see Amazon books for a sample – any more than to being a complete authority on the history of the dispute, but I have reached some conclusions, diplomatic and military.

First, the diplomatic: Mrs Thatcher was twice fortunate. The Argentine junta apparently abandoned its original plan of a limited descent on the Islands to remove the small garrison of Royal Marines and the Governor and then to call for a United Nations presence to replace them, and for meaningful talks to begin. Lack of discipline and public reaction led them to a more-than-symbolic invasion of some 12,000 troops. Had this not happened it is hard to see how Britain could have responded with a Task Force of 120 ships, nor would we have had any diplomatic support for a military response. Meaningful talks would have had to follow.

This was not the only diplomatic piece of luck. It is clear from various sources, including the long personal account in her own hand that Mrs Thatcher wrote some months after the war, that at certain junctures in the intense diplomacy  –  between the initial Argentine invasion and the engagement in action of the Task Force  –  Argentina, with her approval, was offered terms for discussions that would have inevitably turned out to Argentina’s advantage, and that the junta rejected them.

Second, a military conclusion. My impression now is that our victory was a very much more close-run thing than I thought at the time, when I believed that once we had substantial forces ashore we were bound to win. Apart from our naval luck with bombs that did not explode, Argentine resistance on land was more formidable than expected or reported at the time, and our logistic difficulties greater. The surrender of Port Stanley clearly came as a great relief.

Since then, things have changed. Much of what follows will be familiar to those here, but perhaps not everything.

Change in Argentina

Military government was promptly ended, and civilian rule has recently enjoyed the success of one elected president completing his term and handing over to his elected opposition successor. There have been truth commissions and measures of transitional justice in the aftermath of military rule. Universal military service has ended and the armed forces have been radically diminished. Efforts have been made to redefine Argentina’s place in the world, and to revise Argentine diplomacy. The dispute with Chile, acute prior to 1982, has been resolved.

Intermittently, relations with the UK and the Islands have been improved by agreements "under the sovereignty umbrella" over fish, communications and other matters, and over visits to the Argentine cemetery and the identification of the remains of the Argentine dead.

But …

Change in the United Kingdom

The issue has receded. It is doubtful whether public opinion has become more informed about it, the general view probably being that the war settled the matter. Some persistent problems and changes are grounds for some preoccupation: I put it mildly, but these grounds do exist. British military capacity has diminished, both army and navy. The diplomatic context relevant to the Falklands has changed. At the time of the war we enjoyed considerable support in Latin America, for example in Chile and Colombia. This is no longer the case.

We also had the support of what was later to be called the European Union. Leaving the EU might have negative practical implications for the Falklands, as it is the principal market for the squid, and perhaps deprives us of some automatic diplomatic solidarity. Leaving has certainly so far damaged our standing in Latin America.

Not only is public opinion indifferently informed, so are other quarters. Expertise on Latin America, with some few and most welcome exceptions, is thin in parliament. In my experience we have commonly had excellent diplomats in the region, but they are weakly supported in the upper reaches of the FCO, where Latin America is made the responsibility of a junior Minister, usually along with several other parts of the world. For a couple of years the Minister learns, and when he has learnt he is then transferred on to something else. Of our recent Foreign Secretaries one was notorious for his inability to find even the major countries on the map, and another’s interest in Brazil was apparently confined to the rhythms of the Lambada. Few are aware that the United States has not changed its view that the Falkland Islands are a disputed territory.

Change in the Falkland Islands

The war ended years of not-so-benign neglect, and the economy of the islands, along with the quality of administration and services, has been transformed; as have the Islands’ defences, with a garrison of some 2,000.

Which brings me to the subject of oil. Oil is not at the moment a fashionable commodity: an unsustainable resource, an exhaustible fossil fuel, a global warmer, a polluter … But it is still interesting enough to have led to successful exploration in Falklands and neighbouring waters. Oil has been found, though not as yet extracted. It is said to be uneconomic at the current world price.

The difficulties do not end there. Extraction could lead to serious confrontation with Argentina. I do not think that the current Argentine government could possibly accept that without previous agreement and I doubt that one is possible. Oil is different from sustainable fish and squid, symbolically as well as materially. Extraction would require collaboration from the South American mainland, which is unlikely to be fully forthcoming. What would be the FCO attitude? Someone told me that it might be "somewhat schizophrenic", differing according to department  –  the Dependencies or the Americas.

What would happen if extraction was attempted? I do not think that the result would be war in the sense of armed conflict, but it might be an "oil war" similar to the Cod War we fought, if that is the right verb, with Iceland, a war of harassment, which you will remember that the Royal Navy lost. The existing defences of the Falklands are not suited to winning such a confrontation. Deep-water oil operations are obviously vulnerable to harassments of a sort that Argentina could easily carry out. If we let things get that far, we would probably end up humiliated.

None of this is meant to be alarmist, but history is full of surprises, politics and international relations are always hard to predict, and one cannot be too careful. The South Atlantic Council is part of that being careful. Speaking as one of its less active members, I feel I owe my vote of thanks to Lord O’Neill and to the SAC’s officers for their contributions to its continued work.

References

  1.     The Official Position of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Falklands (Malvinas) Question and on the Historical Background, as published in November 2013 is given on the SAC website.
        The British government has not published any detailed legal or historical statement of its position since the 1982 war. The most thorough research and analysis contesting the Argentine position is the book by Graham Pascoe, Falklands Facts and Fallacies.  Return
     
  2.     For the argument that the Falkland Islanders do have the right to self-determination, but the referendum in March 2013 did not meet the UN criteria for an act of self-determination, see the Comment by Peter Willetts  on this website.  Return
     
  3.     H.S. Ferns, Argentina, (New York: Praeger and London: Ernest Benn, Nations of the Modern World Series, 1969), quote from p. 259-60. Harry Ferns was Canadian.  Return

 

A note on books.

A list of titles, probably familiar to members, that I have looked at again to refresh my memory.

Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, (1929, reprinted Yale UP, 1982). In English, the pioneering history of the dispute. The introduction to the reprint is misleading on important points.

Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute, (Wiley-Blackwell, 1989). An excellent series of interviews exploring the pre-war diplomacy related to the Islands.

Simon Jenkins and Max Hastings, The Battle for the Falklands, (Michael Joseph, 1983). The best contemporary account.

Lawrence Freedman., The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 vols., (Routledge, 2007).

Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland Islands, (Oxford University Press, 1996). Covers the arguments of both sides, not as good a book as Goebel, and not everyone in or out of the profession of international law will be convinced by his notions of sovereignty flowing this way and that.

V. Boyson, The Falkland Islands, (Clarendon Press, 1924). Disgracefully, never reprinted.

Mrs Thatcher’s own account is available on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website. There are several “Topics” related to the Falklands on the Guides to the Archives, 1979-90  web page.

Dr Malcolm Deas is an Emeritus Fellow of Latin American Politics at St Antonys College, Oxford. He was one of the original staff of the Latin American Centre, when it was founded in 1965, and for a number of stretches he was its Director. His own research has been chiefly on the history of Colombia, but he has also worked on Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. In addition to his academic work, he has contributed to The New Statesman, The Listener, The Spectator and The London Review of Books. For five years after the Falklands War, he wrote the leaders on Latin America for The Times.

This event also turned out to be our farewell to Lord O’Neill, who died on 26 August 2020  —  see his obituary from the SAC.

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Last updated on 18 Nov 2020.